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1CHAPTER 1. MOTIVATION
Experimental economic’s legitimacy rests in large part on the ability to control all rel-
evant behavioral factors. Online labor markets have recently been used as a substitute
in some cases for behavioral laboratories in experimental studies. The internet as an
experimental testing ground explicitly fits studies aimed at understanding behavior in
that context, while other studies benefit from the relatively inexpensive platform and
ease of deployment. The results generated in this study have implications for how we
understand repeated trust behavior in online communities and how we do experimental
research outside the lab. Identifying the differences between experiments run on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk and experiments run in behavioral laboratories provide a foundation on
which studies of dynamic internet-based behavior can be understood relative to lab-based
studies, and as stand-along results. This study may serve as a reference point from which
to relate the results from Mechanical Turk and behavioral labs.
While many studies have shown similarities between survey responses and single-shot
games between platforms, and one study has replicated a lab-based repeated game on Me-
chanical Turk, this study will be the first to directly test equivalence between populations’
behavioral factors and trust and trustworthiness in a dynamic learning environment. This
paper develops and tests a highly controlled repeated trust game on Mechanical Turk and
in a behavioral lab at Iowa State University in mid April 2016.
This study has strong external validity. Anonymous economic exchanges occur daily
for most in developed nations at this time, especially with the increasing prevalence of
online marketplaces. A whole class of these given economic transactions resemble the
trust game in structure. For this reason, the trust game allows researchers to understand
a broad set of economic relationships in a well-defined structure and run experiments to
determine behavior of real actors.
This work extends the experimental findings of the past few decades, which show
an increase in trust and trustworthiness with visible choice history information, and a
qualitative and quantitative similarity in surveys and single-shot games between lab-based
and MTurk based studies.
2A long history of studies has tested a wide range of questions related to the trust game.
Reputation and visible choice history has been shown to increase trust and trustworthiness
in lab populations. This type of result has been important developing successful digital
marketplaces such as those used by eBay, circumventing the necessity of costly screening
or enforcement mechanisms like surveys or legal agreements, providing a low-cost dynamic
mechanism for increasing trust and trustworthiness in their marketplaces. Some common
internet applications of this type range from online commerce platforms like eBay to
ratings services like Yelp, from sharing services like Uber and AirBnB to crowdfunding
platforms like Kickstarter. With the increased use of online marketplaces, reputation
scoring has been an important low-cost, socially constructed tool for increasing trusting
and trustworthy behavior [37].
We know a great deal from a long history of studies on the repeated trust game and
reputation information in the lab, but while much work has been done testing equivalence
between lab and MTurk populations’ responses in survey and singe-shot games, tests for
similar equivalence for the repeated trust game remain limited. We know that in 2010
Mason and Suri reproduce a public goods game with quantitative similarities [29] [34],
but did not include behavioral factors. These comparison studies provide confirmation
that is reasonable to expect that the two subject pools behave in similar ways in surveys,
single-shot games, and repeated games, the field does not have an adequate answer to
the question of equivalence between the two populations’ behavior and behavioral factors.
The primary question this study attempts to address is whether there is equivalence in
trust and trustworthiness in the repeated trust game between studies run in a behavioral
lab and on Mechanical Turk. Can we use Mechanical Turk for this type of study and
expect to see equivalent behavior and behavioral factors to a lab-based version of the
study? Is there something about behavior in online anonymous contexts that is different
from the lab context?
To answer these questions, this paper develops an experiment to test a particular
form of reputation score for the repeated trust game to answer two questions: (1) do lab
and MTurk populations respond to the same behavioral factors, and (2) are the results
3between the groups equivalent? Section 2 will present studies testing the equivalence of
lab and MTurk data in survey and single-shot games and will outline the seminal exper-
imental studies on the repeated trust game. This will set up this study’s experimental
design and provide a reasonable expectation of the results. Section 3 will then outline
the study’s experimental design. Section 4 will report the results from this study and
highlight the shortcomings of the methodology and design. All potential results should
have methodological and applicational implications for experimentalists, theorists, and
entrepreneurs.
4CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE
Recently, a wide range of studies historically conducted in behavioral labs with undergrad-
uate student populations have been run online using interfaces and population groups like
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [20] [21] [6]. While a number of population groups of
this type exist, MTurk has become the primary venue for this type of research. Previous
work has shown that in general, studies run on MTurk show similar results to those run
in behavioral labs [34] [29] [10] [11].
MTurk and Lab
Broadly speaking, experimental studies can be broken into two classes: static (survey
and single-shot games) and dynamic (learning and repeated games). A large body of
evidence tests surveys and single-shot games, suggesting there are qualitative similarities
between lab and MTurk participants’ behavior [34] [3] [12].
But the qualitative difference between dynamic and single-shot games has the po-
tential to be specifically affected by a subject’s context. For example, we know from
previous studies that participants’ behavior is conditioned on previous experience in the
game and their pairings’ choice history, with significant time dependence [32] [8] [4] [5] [9].
It appears that participants learn behavior during the game conditional on the behavior
of their pairings. While we know the individual behaviors in a one-stage trust game are
likely to be similar across lab and MTurk populations, the element of learning in dynamic
games is qualitatively different from single-shot games.
While it may easily be the case that the behavioral differences between Turk and Lab
in single-shot games are identical to those in repeated games. There is reason to believe
that dynamic behavior in these games is qualitatively different from static responses,
since behavior in repeated games is learned while within the context of the study. It is
clear there is reason to question this assumption.
5MTurk Dynamic Games
Precisely describing the behavioral factors and equivalence of results between population
groups is a necessary condition for strong, reliable data. There appears to be only one
study approaching the question of equivalence between lab and MTurk populations in
dynamic games. Suri and Watts replicated the public goods game used by Fehr and
Gachter in the lab and on MTurk [18] [41] [34] [1]. They found quantitative similarities
between populations. The study is important, providing a ballpark comparison, showing
general similarities between populations, but the design did not include or test behavioral
factors.
There are a number of reasons to more thoroughly test equivalence in the repeated
trust game, evaluating participants’ responses to behavioral factors across both popula-
tions and applying an equivalence test to the behavioral responses. Firstly, it is quite
an achievement to show quantitative similarity between populations, but if there are dif-
ferences between behavioral factors, we cannot completely conclude equivalence. This
limitation of the analysis presented by Suri and Watts is addressed in this study. Sec-
ondly, there is reason to precisely control for interface effects. Experimental results are
strongly dependent on subtle nuances of the experimental design and no replication study
perfectly reproduces the original study. This may be of relatively small concern since the
results in Suri and Watts were very similar, but is clearly an important consideration.
Thirdly, there is reason to test the question of equivalence specifically in the trust game.
The incentives are quite different for participants in the repeated trust game than in
public goods games, so without any other justification it is worthwhile to directly test
equivalence between populations in the trust game. Fourth, while there is considerable
evidence that differences in stakes between lab and MTurk experiments do not affect be-
havior, this study holds payment constant across populations, removing another potential
source of variation.
These are the primary considerations when using behavioral results to justify equiva-
lence between the two populations. While many repeated games are suitable to test the
question of equivalence between populations, the trust game with visible choice history
6information provides strong external validity, a baseline from an extensive literature, in-
teresting conclusions about online-specific behavior, and allows more thorough analysis
of participants’ behavioral factors. For these reasons, the trust game with a visible repu-
tation history provides an effective tool to study the question of equivalence in behavioral
factors and responses in the repeated trust game for lab and MTurk populations.
Repeated Trust Games
Much experimental work has been done in repeated games with varying levels of infor-
mation about participants’ pairings in many types of games [13] [40] [25] [26] [36] [38]
[42]. Specifically in the trust game, experimental results have long demonstrated that
choice history as a measure of reputation is an important behavioral factor in the re-
peated trust game, increasing participants’ the trust and trustworthiness [2] [7] [19] [23]
[30] [31] [39]. The effect depends in part on how the score is constructed, but all evidence
suggests the results are dynamically robust, with the exclusion of end-game effects. The
earliest literature began with a two stage investment game with social history. While not
a dynamic game, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe [4] demonstrated history effects do play
a role in determining participant’s behavior in a trust game in their 1994 paper, Trust,
Reciprocity, and Social History, testing whether participants behaved differently in the
trust game when they could see the behavior of a previous group.
To do this, they ran two groups in a single-shot trust game, ‘Social History’ and ‘No
History’ groups, showing the ‘No History’ group no previous results, and showing the
‘Social History’ group the results from the first group. In each group, participants were
randomly separated into two rooms A and B, and paired with a partner with whom they
could not communicate. Participants in room A chose how much to invest. This amount
was tripled, sent to room B, where the participants chose how much to send back. From
their paper, the results from the ‘No History’ group are displayed in Figure 1 [4].
7Figure 1: Trust experiment results showing amount sent, total return, and payback. No
history was provided to the subjects. [4]
After these results were collected, the researchers re-ran the experiment allowing par-
ticipants to see the results from the ‘No History’ experiment. From their paper, Figure
2 displays the results from the ‘Social History’ experiment [4].
Figure 2: Trust experiment results showing amount sent, total return, and payback. A
social history was provided to the subjects. [4]
The researchers concluded that there were three main differences between ‘No History’
and ‘Social History’. (1) Average return on trust increased from -$0.50 to $1.10. (2) The
8correlation increased between amounts sent and payback. (3) Both control and treatment
provided enough evidence to reject the subgame perfect hypothesis.
In a dynamic version of the game, Keser extended the literature beyond two peri-
ods, introducing the concept of a reputation management system in the 2003 paper,
Experimental Games for the Design of Reputation Management Systems [24]. The study
found significant improvements in trustworthiness with the introduction of a reputation
management system. In short, the experimental evidence suggests that ‘Long Run Repu-
tation’ induces greater levels of trustworthiness than ‘Short Run Reputation’, which itself
induces greater levels of trustworthiness than the baseline, no visible reputation. This is
shown in Figure 3 from the paper [24].
Figure 3: Buyers’ investment over time [24]
The results indicate increased levels of trust and trustworthiness with the introduction
of the two reputation management systems. Efficiency, the payoff for a pair, increased
from an average of 69% in the baseline to 79% in the short-run and 80% in the long-
run reputation systems. Kesser’s results strongly indicate that visible reputation history
induces improvements for both buyers and sellers.
Bohnet and Huck add to Keser’s findings by adding a paired baseline in their 2004
paper [8]. In phase 1 of the experiment, a ‘stranger’, ‘reputation-stranger’, and ‘partner’
group play the trust game for 10 rounds. In phase 2, all participants play in the ‘stranger’
9group, to determine history effects. From their paper, the trust rates are shown in Figure
4 and the trustworthiness rates are shown in Figure 5 [8].
Figure 4: Trust Rates [8]
Figure 5: Trustworthiness Rates [8]
The evidence suggests both the reputation-stranger and partner treatments increase
trust and trustworthiness. In phase 1, all three groups exhibit strong end-game effects
near the end of the first 10 rounds, as phase 1 concludes. Their conclusion for phase 1
is that “direct and indirect reputation systems increase trust and trustworthiness in the
short-run.” [8]
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CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This paper uses the results from previous experiments and the general similarities between
MTurk and lab single-shot games as motivation to test whether results collected in the Lab
and on MTurk have similar behavioral factors and produce comparable results. Similar
to previous literature, the study uses a decision tree designed such that cooperation
increases mutual gain but defection is the dominant strategy. In this game, trust is risky,
and trustworthiness is visible.
The decision tree used in this study is similar to previous studies [17] [2]. Participants
receive (a,a) at the beginning of each round. Player 1 is given the choice of K or T
(keep or trust). If she chooses T, Player 2 can either play D or C (defect or cooperate),
with payoffs (b,b), or (l,g) respectively, such that (1) g > b > a > l ≥ 0, and (2)
g + l < 2a < 2b [16]. Previous studies have set payoffs: g = 1.20, b = 0.60, a = 0.40,
l = 0. The general trust game is graphically represented in Figure 6.A. This study uses
points, setting payoffs: g = 6, b = 3, a = 2, l = 0. Figure 6.B shows the decision tree
used in this study.
Figure 6: A & B Decision tree for this study
While the majority of the study’s experimental design aligns with previous literature,
there are a few important differences [8] [24] [4] [9] [7] [23] [2]. Firstly, this study induces
indefinite horizons by disallowing participants from predicting the final period or knowing
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the probability the study will end in any given period. Similar studies have been con-
ducted on finite horizons, showing a significant decrease in cooperation near the end of
the repeated game. One explanation given is that participants learned over time, increas-
ing the likelihood that their strategies began to align with the game theoretic dominant
strategy. An alternative explanation is that participants realize they could “cash in” their
reputation for higher payoffs near the end of the experiment. As a possible additional
answerable question, this study will induce indefinite horizons, allowing us to distinguish
between end-game effects and learning. These “end-game” effects have been shown to
occur under all levels of information. While indefinite horizons makes modeling ratio-
nal behavior more difficult (in fact, there is no unique Nash equilibrium), it allows the
data to distinguish between end-game effects and learning behavior, and allows computer
simulation, providing stronger external validity.
Secondly, the study builds on previous work to ensure anonymity in the lab and de-
velops a similar procedure for Mechanical Turk. Anonymity has been shown to increase
selfish behavior. Preserving anonymity across populations was important in controlling
information about other participants, an important factor in participants’ decisionmak-
ing.
Thirdly, the study was run in a behavioral lab at Iowa State University and on Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk, using identical software during a two week period in mid-late
April 2016. While the timeframe may be unimportant, the experiment was run for both
populations during a relatively short period, controlling for most seasonal or year factors.
Indefinite Horizons
To fully induce indefinite horizons, this experiment required constructing a mechanism
to convince participants that they cannot predict the final period, or even make decisions
based on knowing the probability the study will end in any given period. Firstly, this dis-
allows participants from employing backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect
solution, eliminating all theoretical end-game effects. Secondly, this removes any possible
discounting related to knowing the probability the study will end in a given round. Doing
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this required (1) participants to not know the exact end period, and (2) participants to
not expect a high probability the game will end in any given period.
Previous studies have used a probability model, where every period has a known and
understood probability of ending. Using this method, however, does not strongly induce
indefinite horizons because participants know the probability that the study will end after
any given round. Assuming rational behavior, rational expectations predicts they will
adjust their behavior to account for the probability of the game ending, which would
affect trust and trustworthiness.
Instead, this experiment sets a fixed number of rounds R, with an additional number of
rounds A selected from a gamma distribution with k = 1, θ = 2. The gamma distribution
with the given parameters is a monotone decreasing function in probability. Participants
will be told R+Amax, where P (A < Amax) = 99% confidence. This will not indicate the
final round and will allow participants to be 99% confident that the game will not run
beyond Amax.
It is believed that inducing indefinite horizons achieves a higher level of external
validity than finite horizons [9]. While it is true that in many cases individuals can
relocate or participate in groups with a known end point, there are few cases in the modern
world where an individual can completely disassociate from their social history. Similarly,
most people have little knowledge about the length of their life, and so cannot behave
under finite horizons in that way either. This study builds an experimental framework
to disallow participants from predicting the final period with a high probability, aligning
behavior more closely with lived experience.
Anonymity - Lab
Additionally, to ensure complete anonymity in the lab, participants names were never
tied to participant’s behavioral data. Upon entering the computer lab, participants were
given a unique key code along with their instructions sheet and informed consent form.
Participants entered their key code into their computer, which will identify them for
research purposes. Upon departure, participants placed their Informed Consent form face
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down in a box, showed the researcher their key code, received their payment envelope,
and inserted their key coder directly into a shredder.
No one had knowledge of who received what payoff. Using a similar methodology to
the work done by Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, and Vernen Smith in their 1996 pa-
per, the ‘payer’ compiled the envelopes in a separate room and the ‘researcher’ collected
the envelopes and delivered them to the participants [19]. The researcher never knew
the amount contained in the envelopes and the payer never interacted with participants,
having no access to identifying information about the participants receiving the payoffs.
No records were kept beyond the explicit results of the game and names collected only
appear on participants’ Informed Consent form, which cannot be used to determine par-
ticipants’ key code. No computer identification, images, video, or sound recordings were
collected.
Anonymity - MTurk
Anonymity on Mechanical Turk is a little more complex. By itself, Mechanical Turk is not
entirely anonymous [27]. However, this study used a version of anonymity to circumvent
this issue. Firstly, no identifying information was collected within the behavioral data.
An intermediate key was used to link behavioral data to participant’s worker ID. This in-
termediate key was deleted upon payment. While the data collected was not anonymous,
the stored data does not contain identifying information the records indeed anonymous.
True anonymity is not entirely possible on Mechanical Turk, and is one limitation of the
study. However, the anonymity developed in the experimental design was strong enough
to make it impossible for anyone to recover identifying information about MTurk workers’
behavior. This procedure was described to MTurk workers is likely sufficient.
Subject Pools
This study uses two participant population groups: undergraduate students at Iowa State
University and Mechanical Turk workers both in mid-late April 2016 [33] [6]. Iowa State
undergraduate students tend to be between 18 and 22, tend to be from middle-income
14
families, and tend to reflect the demographics of Iowa relative to the US population.
Relative to the typical undergraduate profile, MTurk workers have characteristics more
representative of the US population in age, geography, and income [33] [6] [20] [35]. A
number of studies use MTurk to collect responses from a population that more accurately
reflects the US population relative to the typical undergraduate population. While many
types of responses are relatively consistent across population characteristics, there are
some types of responses that are affected by who responds. For example, risk preferences
have been shown to be colinear with age, which is an important consideration when
comparing studies involving risky behavior. Since this study involves behaving under
risk, there is reason to believe MTurk workers will behave in slightly less risk-prone ways.
This and other factors are important to highlight as a possible source of difference in
behavior between populations.
Software
There are a number of platforms for running dynamic studies directly on external plat-
forms or within the MTurk interface [22] [28]. These software options have become
increasingly straightforward and flexible in recent years. oTree was the software package
used in this study for both lab and MTurk sessions [14]. The only change between sessions
was the inclusion of the informed consent document in the MTurk version. The software
is well documented, has a simple API and good support.
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CHAPTER 4. SESSIONS
Invitations to participate in the lab-based experiment were sent out to undergraduate
students at Iowa State University via an email. The email list of students were purchased
from the university’s Office of the Registrar. The recruitment email included information
such as time length, compensation and eligibility of the study. Students who had interest
in the study were asked for fill out an online survey by entering their email address and
choosing available time slots. Documentation of Iowa State University’s Institutional
Review Board’s approval of the study and the recruitment email are included in the
appendix.
Invitations to participate in the MTurk-based experiment were posted on the Amazon
Mechanical Turk marketplace, including a link to the scheduling survey. MTurk workers
expressing interest in participating in the study were emailed the instructions and a
survey link at the time of the session. The recruitment post is included in the appendix.
Three groups of participants were recruited for lab sessions. The group sizes were 12,
20, and 12, for a total of 44 responses. Four groups of participants were recruited for
Turk sessions. The group sizes were 12, 20, 12, and 12. The attrition rate was non-zero,
accounting for around 2 participants per session. Similar to other studies, a bot was used
to handle attrition, simulating ‘typical’ behavior. Only data collected from participants
who correctly submitted responses were used.
Lab Sessions
The following protocol was used in the Lab.
Step 1: Contact students by mass email. Those who have interest in the study will be
asked to provide their email addresses and choose their available time slots on an online
form. The online form does not collect research data.
Step 2: Participants were invited to the computer lab in 68 Heady Hall and ad-
ministered a computer-based lab session. The session lasted no longer than two hours,
depending on the number of randomly selected rounds. When participants arrived at the
16
testing facility, they were given a $5 participation fee, an envelope containing a randomly
generated key code, an instructions sheet (included in the appendix), and an informed
consent document. The participants were instructed to sit at a computer positioned
to maximize separation, read through the instructions, and sign the informed consent
document. After 5 minutes, the experimenter asked for questions, read through the
instructions out lout, and collected the informed consent documents.
Step 3: After all questions were answered and informed consent forms collected, partic-
ipants entered their key code into the computer beginning the game. The game continued
for a randomly selected number of rounds. After R rounds, the participants finished the
game. Each participant was instructed to hand the experimenter their key code, receiving
their total payoff in a sealed envelope. Participants’ key codes were shredded immedi-
ately upon payment. As described above, these envelopes were filled by the payer in
another room, never interacting with the participants. Without interacting with payer,
the researcher collected the envelopes at the end of the game, and distributed them in
the lab. This double-blind setup is outlined above and was made clear to participants in
the instructions.
MTurk Sessions
The following protocol was used for Mechanical Turk.
Step 1: A survey was posted to the Mechanical Turk marketplace with available time
slots for the study. The online form did not collect research data.
Step 2: Respondents to the post were recruited to participate online in a version of the
study identical to the Lab-Based study. Participants were given a randomly generated
key code and asked to electronically sign an Informed Consent form. The study did not
require participants be in the same location. There is no way to link any data to any
individual person.
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Step 3: Once the Informed Consent document was completed, participants were di-
rected to input their key code and begin the study. The study continued for a randomly
selected number of rounds. Once all rounds were complete, each participant was com-
pensated using their randomly generated key code via Mechanical Turk payments.
Instructions
All participants will be given the following instructions.
“This study will last for a randomly selected number of rounds. We are 99.9% con-
fident the study will continue no longer than 30 rounds or two hours. At the beginning
of the study you will be randomly assigned to the role of Person 1 or Person 2. You will
maintain this role throughout the entire study. Each round, you will be paired with one
other randomly selected participant, called your pairing. Each round, Person 1 will be
given the choice between “R” and “S”. If Person 1 chooses “S”, Person 2 will be given
the choice between “U” and “V”. Based on your decisions and your pairing’s decisions,
you will receive the following payoffs from the tree below. Person 1’s payoffs are on the
top, and Person 2’s payoffs are on the bottom. Payoff values are represented by points,
and will be converted to dollars at the end of the study.
Figure 6.C: Instruction Game Tree
18
“Each round you will be presented with a screen containing the following: your role as
Person 1 and Person 2 (which does not change), the current round, and the decision tree,
your choice history, and your pairing’s choice history. Feel free to refer to the instructions
during the study. At the end of each round you will be presented with a payoff screen,
displaying your final payoff and your choice history.
“This choice history is designed to tell you and your pairing what choices each other
had made in previous periods. The choice history keeps track of how many R’s and S’s
Person 1 has chosen, and how many U’s and V’s Person 2 has chosen. The following
table is a hypothetical scenario.
Table 1: Example Decision Table
ROUND
PERSON 1 PERSON 2
CHOICE (R,S) CHOICE (U,V)
4 S (1,3) V (1,2)
3 R (1,2) - (1,1)
2 S (0,2) U (1,1)
1 S (0,1) V (0,1)
0 (0,0) (0,0)
“Initially, both Person 1 and Person 2 start with a choice history of (0,0). In round
1, Person 1 chooses S and Person 2 chooses V. At the end of round 1 Person 1’s score is
(0,1), since Person 1 has chosen R zero times and chosen S one time. Person 2’s score
is (0,1), since Person 2 has chosen U zero times and chosen V one time. At the end of
period 4 we can see that Person 1 has chosen R one time and chosen S three times, while
Person 2 has chosen U one time and chosen V two times. The choice history continues
for all rounds in the study. This information can be used to inform your choices in the
study.
“When the study ends, you will receive the total of all your payoffs, which is displayed
on your screen. All choices are confidential and anonymous. No one will know who you
are or what choices you made in the game, including the researchers.”
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Lab participants were told the following:
“Upon conclusion of the study, the payer will compile all participant payoffs in en-
velopes in a second room, labeling each with the ID number of the participant receiving
the payoff. The payer will deliver the box to a secure location, where the researcher will
collect it and return to the computer lab. The researcher and payer will not meet or
communicate during the study. Upon departure, show the researcher your ID number to
receive an envelope containing your payoff amount. The researcher will not know your
payoff and will immediately insert your ID number directly into a shredder. No one will
be able to trace your behavior in the study back to you. You will be free to leave.”
MTurk participants were told the following:
“Upon conclusion of the study, you will be presented with a unique Mechanical Turk
code. Submit this code in Mechanical Turk to receive compensation. No one will be able
to trace your behavior in the study back to you.”
20
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
The primary questions this study attempts to answer are (1) whether the behavioral fac-
tors are similar between populations, and (2) whether the behavioral results are equiv-
alent. The first question is best answered by comparing the regression results of each
population. The second question is best answered using a hypothesis test joint with an
equivalence test. These questions will be thoroughly examined in later sections. First,
however, graphing the time-trend data provides an intuitive description of participants’
behavior over time, across populations and roles.
Population Graphs
The following tables graph the results from all sessions. In total, there were 44 lab
participants and 56 MTurk participants. Figure 7 displays the payoffs for all participants
in the lab, showing a relatively stable average payoff for Person 1, and a general decrease
in average payoff for Person 2. The average payoff for Person 1 in the lab is 2.006, and
on MTurk is 2.086. The average payoff for Person 2 in the lab is 3.989 and on MTurk is
3.847.
Figure 7: Lab Payoff
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Figure 8 displays the payoffs for all participants on MTurk, showing a similar story,
with relatively stable average payoffs over time for both Person 1 and Person 2. However,
there does appear to be a slight decrease in Person 1’s average payoff over time, while
Person 2’s average payoff stays relatively stable at around 3 points.
Figure 8: MTurk Payoff
To get a sense of the behavior behind the payoffs, Figure 9 displays the number of Rs
and Us chosen by all participants in the lab, showing players’ ‘selfishness’ each round. It
appears that there is an early period of learning, followed by a general stabilization after
round 10 around a range of total group selfish choices for both Person 1 and Person 2.
Among Turk participants, we see similar behavior. Figure 10 displays the number of
Rs and Us chosen by all participants on MTurk, showing players’ ‘selfishness’ each round.
There appears to be an initial period of stability, followed by a second period of stability
at a higher level of selfishness.
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Figure 9: Lab Selfishness
Figure 10: Turk Selfishness
However, since Person 2’s choices are dependent on Person 1 choosing S, it is more
informative to show the ratio of selfish choices to total choices. Figure 11 displays the
ratio of Person 1 choosing R over total choices, and the ratio of Person 2 choosing U over
total choices for lab participants.
23
Figure 11: Lab Ratios
Figure 12 shows the anologue visualization of the selfish behavior ratio among Turk
participants. There is a clear time trend toward higher levels of selfishness in later periods.
Figure 12: Turk Ratios
Behavioral Estimation
An important component in understanding and testing the equivalence between lab and
turk dynamic behavior in the trust game is thoroughly examining the behavioral factors
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motivating participants’ choices. To determine participants’ behavioral factors, previous
papers on the repeated trust game have used an OLS regression [8]. This paper uses sim-
ilar methods. Probit models are included in the appendix as a reference, but provided
similar results, so were not included in this section. The following is a comprehensive list
of regressors used in the analysis, capturing choice history information and observed past
behavior from the study.
Variable Description
OwnLastChoice A participant’s choice last round (RU=1)
OwnLastThree A participant’s last three choices
OtherLastChoice A participant’s last pairing’s choice
OtherLastThree A participant’s last three pairings’ choices
PairingLastChoice A participant’s current paring’s last choice
PairingLastThree A participant’s current pairing’s last three choices
OwnScoreRatio A participant’s RU’s over RU’s + SV’s + 1
OtherScoreRatio A participant’s pairing’s RU’s over RU’s + SV’s + 1
Round The round number
OwnLastChoice - This is a binary variable capturing a participant’s propensity to be
in/consistent with the last period. Participants for whom this variable is statistically
significant make choices with a dependency on their choice in the previous period.
OwnLastThree - This is an integer variable between 0-3, extending the information
captured in OwnLastChoice to a participants choices in the past three rounds, with a
similar interpretation.
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OtherLastChoice - This is a binary variable capturing the participants’ pairing’s choice
in the previous round. This variable captures the effect of a participant’s observed re-
sponse from their pairing in the last round on their next behavior. If this variable is
statistically significant it shows a participant’s past experiences have an effect on future
behavior.
OtherLastThree - This is an integer variable between 0-3, extending the information
captured in OtherLastChoice to a participants choices in the past three rounds, with a
similar interpretation.
PairingLastChoice - This is a binary variable capturing the information available
to a participant about their current participant’s previous choice. If this variable is
statistically significant, it shows that a participant’s pairing’s last choice has a significant
effect on a participants choice. A positive coefficient indicates a participant is more likely
to choose RU if their current pairing’s last choice is RU.
PairingLastThree - This is an integer variable between 0-3, extending the information
captured in OtherLastChoice to a participants choices in the past three rounds, with a
similar interpretation.
OwnScoreRatio - This is a variable representing the ratio of times the participant has
chosen RU over the total number of times the participant has chosen plus one to avoid
division by zero.
OtherScoreRatio - This variable represents the same ratio as OwnScoreRatio for a
participants current pairing.
Round - This variable represents the round number. If this variable is statistically
significant it indicates a time-dependence of behavior.
Regression Analysis
The following is a comprehensive list of regressions run in Stata. These regressions used
the regressors defined and interpreted above. Person 2 data has been refined in the
regressions of Person 2’s choices to omit the trivial cases in which Person 1 had chosen R.
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This omitted data is not significant to this analysis since in those cases Person 2 wasn’t
given an opportunity to choose.
In Table 2 we see that for Person 1 in the lab, the statistically significant regressors
are OwnLastThree, PairingLastChoice, and OwnScoreRatio. From the regressors
with a positive coefficient we know that participants with the role of Person 2 in the lab
are more likely to choose R when their pairing has chosen U in the previous round, and
if they have a larger ratio of Rs to total choices. From the regressor with a negative
coefficient we know participants are less likely to choose R if they have chosen more Rs
in the last three rounds.
Table 2 - Lab Person 1 OLS
OwnChoiceCode Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t|
OwnLastChoice -.0255969 .0535172 -0.48 0.633
OwnLastThree -.1712405 .0292931 -5.85 0.000
OtherLastChoice .0891137 .0663103 1.34 0.180
OtherLastThree .0481677 .0377105 1.28 0.202
PairingLastChoice .0969812 .0535932 1.81 0.071
PairingLastThree .051581 .0343943 1.50 0.135
OwnScoreRatio 1.81863 .1343329 13.54 0.000
OtherScoreRatio .1003982 .0899825 1.12 0.265
Round .0047317 .00294 1.61 0.108
cons -.1388131 .0443275 -3.13 0.002
N 352
R-squared 0.5728
In Table 3 we see that for Person 1 on MTurk, the statistically significant regressors are
OwnLastChoice, OwnLastThree, OtherLastChoice, PairingLastChoice, Own-
ScoreRatio, and Round. From the regressors with positive a positive coefficient we
know participants with the role of Person 1 on MTurk are more likely to choose R if their
last pairing chose U, if their current pairing chose U last round, if they have a higher
ratio of Rs to total choices, and as the study progresses. Additionally, a participant is
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more likely to choose R if they did last round, but less likely to choose R if they chose
more Rs in the past three rounds.
Table 3 - Turk Person 1 OLS
OwnChoiceCode Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t|
OwnLastChoice .1581113 .0438926 3.60 0.000
OwnLastThree -.1188241 .0232449 -5.11 0.000
OtherLastChoice .251253 .0576131 4.36 0.000
OtherLastThree -.0161192 .0329076 -0.49 0.624
PairingLastChoice .1062855 .0476666 2.23 0.026
PairingLastThree .0429627 .0324881 1.32 0.187
OwnScoreRatio 1.472574 .1100017 13.39 0.000
OtherScoreRatio -.1720637 .1186434 -1.45 0.148
Round .0068484 .0027414 2.50 0.013
cons -.0742002 .0361015 -2.06 0.040
N 594
R-squared 0.4454
While OwnLastThree, PairingLastChoice, and OwnScoreRatio, are statisti-
cally significant for both Turk and Lab, OwnLastChoice, OtherLastChoice, and
Round are statistically significant for Turk, but not for Lab. The directional effects are
consistent across all significant regressors shared. Participants on MTurk but not in the
lab are more likely to choose R if they did in the previous round, if their last pairing
chose U, and in later rounds (although the round effect may show up in the lab with
more data). This seems to suggest that participants with the role of Person 1 on MTurk
are more conditional on the previous round than are lab participants. As opposed to lab
participants, MTurk participants are more likely to choose R if they did last round and
if their pairing chose U.
In Table 4 we see that for Person 3 (excluding all trivial cases from Person 2), the
statistically significant regressors are OwnLastChoice, OwnLastThree, OtherLast-
Three, PairingLastThree, and OwnScoreRatio. From the regressors with positive
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coefficients we know that participants with the role of Person 2 in the lab are more likely
to choose U if their pairing has chosen more Rs in the past three rounds, and they have
chosen more Us as a ratio of total choices. From the regressors with negative coefficients
we know that participants with the role of Person 2 in the lab are less likely to choose U
if they have chosen U in the last round or in the last three rounds, or if their last three
pairings have chosen R.
Table 4 - Lab Person 3 OLS
OwnChoiceCode Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t|
OwnLastChoice -.394612 .0730768 -5.40 0.000
OwnLastThree -.2388892 .0447419 -5.34 0.000
OtherLastChoice -.0087417 .0677548 -0.13 0.897
OtherLastThree -.1144297 .0337947 -3.39 0.001
PairingLastChoice .0199778 .0614138 0.33 0.745
PairingLastThree .1178724 .0473317 2.49 0.014
OwnScoreRatio 2.072604 .1276353 16.24 0.000
OtherScoreRatio -.3538946 .2591849 -1.37 0.174
Round -.0044556 .0032197 -1.38 0.168
cons .0922431 .0438105 2.11 0.037
N 205
R-squared 0.6284
In Table 5 we see that for Person 3 (excluding all trivial cases from Person 2), the
statistically significant regressors are OwnLastChoice, OwnLastThree, OwnScor-
eRatio. From the regressor with a positive coefficient we know that participants with
the role of Person 2 on MTurk are more likely to choose U if they have chosen more Us
as a ratio of total choices. From the regressors with a negative coefficient we know that
participants with the role of Person 2 on MTurk are less likely to choose U if they have
chosen U in the last round or the last three rounds.
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Table 5 - Turk Person 3 OLS
OwnChoiceCode Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t|
OwnLastChoice -.2246506 .0614232 -3.66 0.000
OwnLastThree -.2299539 .0395798 -5.81 0.000
OtherLastChoice -.0097833 .0546682 -0.18 0.858
OtherLastThree -.0371792 .029074 -1.28 0.202
PairingLastChoice .0709889 .0511046 1.39 0.166
PairingLastThree .010535 .0321182 0.33 0.743
OwnScoreRatio 2.10831 .130649 16.14 0.000
OtherScoreRatio -.1305851 .18379 -0.71 0.478
Round .0033836 .0031402 1.08 0.282
cons .007813 .0360986 0.22 0.829
N 333
R-squared 0.5283
While OwnLastChoice, OwnLastThree, and OwnScoreRatio are statistically
significant for both Turk and Lab, OtherLastThree and PairingLastThree are sta-
tistically significant for Lab, but not for Turk. The directional effects are consistent across
all significant regressors shared. Participants in the lab, but not on MTurk are less likely
to choose U if their last three pairings have chosen R, and are more likely to choose U if
their current pairing has chosen R in the last three rounds. This seems to suggest that
participants with the role of Person 2 in the lab, but not on MTurk, respond positively
to being trusted after being trusted less in recent rounds, are are more likely to punish
Person 1 for non-trusting behavior. As opposed to participants with the role of Person 2
on MTurk, it is as if participants with the role of Person 2 in the lab work to show their
trustworthiness after not being fully trusted in recent rounds, and are willing to punish
Person 1 for not being trusting in previous rounds. While interesting and potentially
illuminating, these two differences do not appear in the Probit models.
While there are a few differences, behavioral factors appear to be mostly equivalent
across populations. There were no directional differences between population groups’s
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statistically significant behavioral factors. The differences in behavioral factors between
Person 1 and Person 2 are striking, resembling what we would expect. We see learning
behavior on the part of Person 1 and stronger type behavior on the part of Person 2.
MTurk Person 2’s behaviors are not statistically significant conditional on their pairings
choice history or their own observed history, while MTurk Person 1s are conditional on
their pairing’s information as well as their observed history (experiences) in the ways we
would expect.
Equivalence
In addition to estimating and comparing the significance and directionality of behavioral
data between both populations, we can directly test the question using an equivalence test
for proportions. If the goal is to show a difference between lab and MTurk participant’s
behaviors, we would use the standard hypothesis test: H0 : pt = pl vs. Ha : pt 6=
pl. However, if the goal is to show equivalence between lab and MTurk participant’s
behaviors, we cannot just conclude that failing to reject H0 provides this result, so we
must use another method.
Using an equivalence test joint with a hypothesis test, there are three possible out-
comes our data may provide for the question of equivalence: yes, no, or not enough data.
The way to begin answering our question is to start with a hypothesis test: can we reject
equivalence between populations? If we find the answer to be yes, we have our result.
If we fail to reject the null hypothesis test, we then apply the equivalence test. In the
event we employ both tests, we must use a Bonferroni Correction in the equivalence test
to adjust α to reflect the increased risk of a Type 1 error from two joint tests. If we fail
to reject the null in the hypothesis test and cannot conclude the equivalence region is
acceptable, we must conclude there is not enough data to make a conclusion. Partici-
pants’ decisions follow a binomial distribution with the statistics for each population is
displayed in Table 6.
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Table 6 - Decision statistics
N K Var p
Lab Person 1 484 215 119.49 0.4442
MTurk Person 1 594 249 144.62 0.4919
Lab Person 2 264 87 58.33 0.3295
MTurk Person 2 333 94 67.47 0.202
Hypothesis Test
To answer the question whether participants’ behavior in dynamic games in the lab is
equivalent to that on MTurk, it is appropriate to begin with a hypothesis test, with the
hypothesis:
H0 : pL = pT
Ha : pL 6= pT
The results from a simple t-Test for a difference in results for Person 1 between lab
and MTurk populations produces a p-value P (T <= t) = 0.410012. The results from a
simple t-Test for a difference in results for Peron 2 between lab and MTurk populations
produces a p-value P (T <= t) = 0.215114. These tests fail to reject the null hypothesis
of the equality of proportions for lab and MTurk behavior for both Person 1 and Person 2.
We cannot conclude Person 1 and Person 2’s behavior is different across lab and MTurk
populations. Since we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we introduce an equivalence test
to strengthen the results.
Equivalence Test
An equivalence test, as distinct from a hypothesis test, develops an equivalence region
in which it is reasonable to conclude equivalence. This method is used because while
we can reject a null hypothesis, we cannot accept a null hypothesis. An equivalence
test uses similar tools to a hypothesis test, allowing us to determine a region of statistical
equivalence in which we can conclude two sample proportions are equivalent. This is done
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by defining two hypothesis tests in the following way, where pL is the true proportion of
Lab participants choosing R or U, and pT is the true proportion of MTurk participants
choosing R or U:
H0 : |pL − pT | > θ
Ha : |pL − pT | < θ
If we reject H0, we can conclude that the difference between proportions falls within
the region of statistical equivalence defined by (−θ, θ). The null hypothesis can be inter-
preted as stating that the absolute difference in proportions is greater than |θ| [15]. The
test statistic with the equivalence margin θ, is as follows:
z =
|pˆT − pˆL|+ θ√
pˆT (1−pˆT )
nT
+ pˆL(1−pˆL)
nL
Using the Bonferoni correction, we have α′ = α2 = 0.01. To determine the equivalence
region in a way that allows us to be 90% confident we have not committed a type 1 error,
we define θ such that P (pL > pT +θ)+P (pL < pT−θ) < α′. We reject the null hypothesis
if z < zα′/2, since the hypothesis test is two-sided. Evaluating the test statistic using
zα′/2 = 2.575829, we can solve for the upper bound on the equivalence region θmax such
that any equivalence region we desire θ < θmax allows us to reject the null hypothesis.
Using d = |pˆL − pˆT |, define the following:
θmax = z
√
pˆT (1− pˆT )
nT
+
pˆL(1− pˆL)
nL
− d
Define θcrit such that d1 < θ
1
crit < θ
1
max and d2 < θ
2
crit < θ
2
max. Solving for Person 1,
we find θ1max = 0.056545. We are 90% confident the populations’ behaviors are equivalent
if the difference in proportions d1 = |pˆ1L − pˆ1T | = 0.025023 is less than θ1max = 0.056545.
Since d1 < θ
1
max, we can conclude that Person 1’s decisions are equivalent across lab
and MTurk populations. Solving for Person 2, we find θ2max = 0.0506630. We are 90%
confident the populations behaviors are equivalent if the difference in proportions d2 =
|p2L− p2T | = 0.04726 is less than θ2max = 0.0506630. Since d2 < θ2max, we can conclude that
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Person 2’s decisions are equivalent across lab and MTurk populations. Since z1 < zα′/2
and z2 < zα′/2 we can reject the null hypotheses for the equivalence tests for both Person
1 and Person 2, and can conclude equivalence in behavioral proportions across lab and
MTurk populations and roles in the binary repeated trust game.
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION
This study aims to test whether (1) the behavioral factors are similar between population
groups, and (2) whether the results are equivalent. Both populations show relatively sta-
ble average payoffs throughout the course of the study, with an apparent slight decrease
in average payoff for both populations and roles over time. In the lab, selfishness appears
to increase slightly over the course of the study. However, this increase is much more pro-
nounced with MTurk participants. As a ratio of choices made, a similar pattern emerges.
While there appears to be a time-trend for both populations, trust and trustworthiness
appear to decline more quickly among MTurk participants than lab participants.
Similar to previous studies, this study used OLS to identify behavioral factors for
each population-role. Lab participants with the role of Person 1 tend to be less trusting
if (1) they have a relatively larger ratio of Rs to total choices, if (2) their pairing chooses
U in the previous round, and if (3) they have chosen relatively more R’s in the past
three rounds. MTurk participants with the role of Person 1 tend to be less trusting if
they have a relatively larger ratio of Rs to total choices, if (1) their last pairing chooses
U, if (2) their current pairing chose U last round, and (3) in later rounds of the study.
Additionally, this group tends to be less trusting if they have chosen R in the last round,
but tend to be more trusting if they have chosen more Rs in the past three rounds.
There are two primary similarities between lab and MTurk participants with the role
of Person 1. Both groups tend to be more trusting if they themselves have been more
trusting in the past and if their pairings last choice was V. This appears to resemble
conditionally cooperative behavior. There are two minor behavioral differences between
lab and MTurk Person 1.
Firstly, MTurk participants, but not lab participants, are more likely to choose R
if their last pairing chose U. This effect does not appear with the participant’s past
three pairings’ behaviors, indicating it is a short-term effect. This behavior could be
characterized as reactionary, since the participant is behaving in ways partially informed
by their experience in the last round. Secondly, MTurk Person 1 behavior becomes
less trusting as the study progresses, controlling for all other variables. This may be
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the result of a slower learning process for MTurk participants, or because participants
become familiar with the choice history table more quickly in the lab.
Lab participants with the role of Person 2 tend to be less trustworthy if (1) they have
chosen relatively more Us as a ratio of their total choices, and if (2) their pairing has
chosen relatively more Rs in the past three rounds, and tend to be more trustworthy if
(1) they have chosen more Us in the last three rounds, and if (2) their last three pairings
have chosen Rs. MTurk participants with the role of Person 2 tend to be less trustworthy
if they have chosen relatively more Us as a ratio of their total choices, and tend to be
more trustworthy if they have chosen more Us in the last three rounds.
An important similarity between lab and MTurk participants with the role of Person
2 is that both groups exhibit behavior influenced by their own past behavior, indicating
choices resembling type behavior. While there are some nuances to this result, it is
expected that Person 2’s behavior would be based very little on Person 1’s choice history.
The results from both the lab and MTurk appear to match this expectation.
There are two exceptions to the perfect Person 2 pure type behavior for lab (but not
MTurk). Firstly, a lab Person 2 being trusted less in the last three rounds increases their
likelihood of being trustworthy. This behavior may arise from the motivation to increase
perceived trustworthiness after recently being perceived as not trustworthy by their recent
pairings. Secondly, a lab Person 2 paired with a less trusting Person 1 decreases their
likelihood of being trustworthy. This behavior may arise from the motivation to punish
non-trusting past behavior on the part of their pairing. These effects do not appear to
be the case for MTurk participants with the role of Person 2.
All types of participants exhibit behavior strongly influenced by the ratio of times
they choose R or U to total choices. This result is very significant for both Person 1
and Person 2 in the lab and on MTurk. This behavioral factor can be thought of as a
participant’s behavioral prior: their behavior is determined in large part by their past
behavior. Given that this ratio is such an important factor in determining participants’
behavior, it is worth noting that while it is visible to every pairing, their pairings score
ratio does not significantly influence participants choices with respect to their pairings.
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Additionally, relative to participants in the role of Perosn 2, Person 1 tends to exhibit
behavior determined by a larger number of factors from their previous pairings’s decisions
and their current pairing’s choice history. The game’s structure creates incentives for
Person 1 to discriminate on Person 2’s choice history, while Person 2 primarily cares
about their perceived trustworthiness. As noted above, this is generally what we would
expect. This result confirms the theory that participants would behave in ways in part
consistent with their incentives, since we see stronger discriminating behavior on the part
of Person 1 than Person 2.
There are, however, deviations from this general result. One nuance is that Lab par-
ticipants with the role of Person 1, relative to MTurk participants, show fewer behavioral
factors influenced by their pairings’ information or their own previous experience. While
MTurk Person 1’s behavior is significantly influenced by a wide range of factors, lab Per-
son 1’s behavior is conditional only on their previous pairings behaviors and their current
pairings’ last choice. Also, as pointed out above, lab participants with the role of Person
2 tend to exhibit behavior punishing low-trusting Person 1s while being more likely to
choose V after being perceived as non-trustworthy in recent periods.
The primary result from this analysis as it relates to the similarities in behavioral
factors is that there are no directional differences across population groups. While some
behavioral factors do not appear to be statistically significant in both populations, all
effects which are statistically significant to both lab and MTurk participants’ behavior
have the same sign. The general result from this behavioral analysis is that there appears
no warning signs appearing in the behavioral factors between lab and MTurk.
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Using the hypothesis test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, the equality of pro-
portions in behavior between lab and MTurk populations for Person 1 and Person 2.
We cannot say behavior is different across populations. Then, with the equivalence test
we define the region in which we can reject the null hypothesis, determining the region
of equivalence for the difference in lab and MTurk proportions. The difference between
lab and MTurk proportions falls within this equivalence region for both Person 1 and
Person 2, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis that the difference is greater than the
equivalence margin. We can conclude behaviors are equivalent across lab and MTurk.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
The primary questions this study attempts to answer are (1) whether participants in the
lab and on MTurk responded to similar behavioral factors, and (2) whether their behav-
ioral responses were equivalent. The results from the regression analysis of participants
behavioral factors indicate that most behavioral factors playing a role in determining
behavior in one population also play a role in the other. We tend to see stronger type
behavior in Person 2 in the lab and MTurk, and while Person 1’s behavior is more con-
ditional on the trustworthiness of their pairing in the lab and MTurk. The most striking
result is that all statistically significant behavioral factors for both lab and MTurk par-
ticipants have the same directional effects. The conclusion that can be drawn is that in
general, lab and MTurk participants respond to similar behavioral factors and in similar
ways.
The results from the hypothesis and equivalence tests show equivalence between pro-
portions’ trust and trustworthiness. This suggests that within a tight region, the behav-
iors of each role can be considered equivalent across lab and MTurk populations. These
results appear to strengthen the case that lab and MTurk participants in experimental
behavioral studies respond to similar reputation information-related behavioral factors
in similar ways, and generally provide behaviors that can be considered equivalent.
This study more thoroughly tests the question of behavioral equivalence between
lab and MTurk population groups. Previous studies have tested this question for survey
responses, and a replication study of a dynamic public goods game has shown quantitative
similarity between behavior in the lab and on MTurk. The recent move toward platforms
like Mechanical Turk provides a less expensive venue for experimentalists and theorists
and may be a more valid population group to test internet-specific behavior. The repeated
trust game provides a venue to capture behavioral dynamics present in many contexts.
Versions of the game have been tested in the lab for a number of decades. This study
offers the strongest confirmation to date that lab and MTurk behavior and behavioral
factors in dynamic games are equivalent.
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APPENDIX B. RECRUITMENT
Lab
Title: Research Participation Opportunity on Repeated Anonymous Behavior
Hello!
I am pleased to invite you to participate in my research study. The study is aimed to
understand how people behave in anonymity over time.
If you’re interested, you will join a group of students for no longer than two hours at
the Department of Economics computer lab (68 Heady Hall) next week. You can expect
a payoff between $6 and $12 per hour. You MUST be at least 18 years old to participate
in the study. The study is totally anonymous and confidential.
If you are interested in participating in the study, please enter your email address and
choose time slots available for you at the following survey form [CLICK HERE]. You will
receive a confirmation email within the next few days.
Please let me know if you have any questions about the study!
Taylor Weidman, Department of Economics
MTurk
I am pleased to invite you to participate in my research study. The study is aimed to
understand how people behave in anonymity over time.
If you’re interested, you will join a group of participants for no longer than two hours
next week. You can expect a payoff between $6 and $12 per hour. You MUST be at least
18 years old to participate in the study. The study is totally anonymous and confidential.
If you are interested in participating in the study, please enter your email address and
choose time slots available for you at the following survey form [CLICK HERE]. You will
receive a confirmation email within the next few days.
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Please let me know if you have any questions about the study!
Taylor Weidman, Department of Economics
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APPENDIX C. PROBIT MODELS
In Table C1 we see that for Person 1 in the lab, the statistically significant regressors are
OwnLastThree, OwnScoreRatio, PairingLastChoice, PairingLastThree,andRound.
This is consistent with Bohnet and Huck [8].
Table C1 - Lab Person 1 Probit
OwnChoiceCode Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t|
OwnLastChoice -.0852393 .2571331 -0.33 0.740
OwnLastThree -.7379263 .1571589 -4.70 0.000
OtherLastChoice .4480077 .3444788 1.30 0.193
OtherLastThree .2439893 .2071971 1.18 0.239
PairingLastChoice .5652565 .2943761 1.92 0.055
PairingLastThree .3737593 .1956111 1.91 0.056
OwnScoreRatio 7.824926 .8510313 9.19 0.000
OtherScoreRatio .3809247 .4729561 0.81 0.421
Round .0427662 .0172838 2.47 0.013
cons -3.073123 .3540644 -8.68 0.000
N 352
Pseudo R2 0.5463
In Table C2 we see that for Person 1 on MTurk, the statistically significant regres-
sors areOwnLastChoice, OwnLastThree, OtherLastChoice, PairingLastChoice,
OwnScoreRatio, and Round.
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Table C2 - Turk Person 1 Probit
OwnChoiceCode Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t|
OwnLastChoice .5667134 .1681347 3.37 0.001
OwnLastThree -.4533925 .0954828 -4.75 0.000
OtherLastChoice 1.029884 .2385062 4.32 0.000
OtherLastThree -.093655 .1390791 -0.67 0.501
PairingLastChoice .475498 .1974478 2.41 0.016
PairingLastThree .1901882 .1341645 1.42 0.156
OwnScoreRatio 5.80363 .5283595 10.98 0.000
OtherScoreRatio -.6589178 .4869144 -1.35 0.176
Round .0354347 .0121851 2.91 0.004
cons -2.399863 .2167579 -11.07 0.000
N 594
Pseudo R2 0.4106
While OwnLastThree, OtherLastChoice, PairingLastChoice, OwnScoreRa-
tio, and Round are statistically significant for both Turk and Lab, PairingLastThree
is statistically significant for the lab but not for MTurk, and OwnLastChoice is sta-
tistically significant for Turk, but not for the lab. The directional effects are consistent
across all significant regressors shared.
In Table C3 we see that Person 3 (excluding all trivial cases from Person 2), the statis-
tically significant regressors are OwnLastChoice, OwnLastThree, OtherLastThree,
and OwnScoreRatio.
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Table C3 - Lab Person 3 Probit
OwnChoiceCode Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t|
OwnLastChoice -2.877025 .8218075 -3.50 0.000
OwnLastThree -1.808976 .4747025 -3.81 0.000
OtherLastChoice -.1890179 .5936044 -0.32 0.750
OtherLastThree -.6783157 .2904572 -2.34 0.020
PairingLastChoice -.0853565 .5104064 -0.17 0.867
PairingLastThree .7385619 .3728183 1.98 0.048
OwnScoreRatio 12.59157 1.928179 6.53 0.000
OtherScoreRatio -1.721388 1.989641 -0.87 0.387
Round -.0420931 .0293096 -1.44 0.151
cons -1.790742 .4163178 -4.30 0.000
N 205
Pseudo R2 0.6548
In Table C4 we see that Person 3 (excluding all trivial cases from Person 2), the statis-
tically significant regressors are OwnLastChoice, OwnLastThree, OwnScoreRatio,
and Round.
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Table C4 - Turk Person 3 Probit
OwnChoiceCode Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t|
OwnLastChoice -.8921582 .3240359 -2.75 0.006
OwnLastThree -.9900291 .2190184 -4.52 0.000
OtherLastChoice -.1001346 .3303921 -0.30 0.762
OtherLastThree -.1818905 .1670641 -1.09 0.276
PairingLastChoice .4513501 .3017445 1.50 0.135
PairingLastThree .0427089 .1705176 0.25 0.802
OwnScoreRatio 8.863281 .9361029 9.47 0.000
OtherScoreRatio -.7923803 .9731262 -0.81 0.415
Round .0329271 .0187194 1.76 0.079
cons -2.206943 .2881792 -7.66 0.000
N 333
Pseudo R2 0.5046
While OwnLastChoice, OwnLastThree, and OwnScoreRatio are statistically
significant for both Turk and Lab, OtherLastThree is statistically significant for Lab,
but not for Turk, and Round is statistically significant for Turk, but not for Lab. The
directional effects are consistent across all significant regressors shared.
